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Ante-nuptial Release of Dower.
By an ante-nuptial agreement, in consideration of five dollars and
love and affection, a woman; of 40 years, released all claim which she, "as
widow," might have in the estate of her intended husband (who was a wid-
ower of 75 years with children), "whether in right of dower or as her dis-
tributive share in the personalty or otherwise, under the laws of the State."
Two days later the woman signed a declaration, reciting the contemplated
marriage and the execution of the ante-nuptial agreement, in which she
stated, "that the money value makes no difference in my action. I do
not care to know the value of his estate; it is the same to me whether it
be $i,ooo or $5ooooo. In view of the information that the value of his
estate may be $5oo,ooo, I repeat and confirm my said deed of relinquish-
ment. I sign this statement, that there may be no question but that I
fullyunderstood what I was doing." Three days later the marriage was
celebrated. On that day the husband executed a paper, which was found
upon his death, about ten weeks afterward, wherein he said: "I expect
to provide for her future, consistent with my ability in a financial way; she
confided in me entirely about doing for her what was just and proper."
During the marital relation he conveyed to his wife a life estate in his
homestead, valued at $io,ooo, and $,500 worth of furniture therein. In
his will he made no provision for his widow. His estate consisted of
$88,00o in personalty and $4o,ooo in realty, besides the homestead, and
his widow claimed her distributive share.
Held: That neither at the common law nor under the Statute of the
State did the ante-nuptial release bar dower. Its enforcement would be
the perpetration of a fraud. The relation was one of confidence. The
declaration of the woman that she did not care to know the value of the
estate, was explained by the paper signed by the husband upon the day
of marriage. The widow was accordingly awarded her distributive share
of the personalty.
I Reported in 52 N. W. Rep., niI6. Decided Oct. 4, 1892.
DOWER, AND ANTE-NUPTIAL
STATEMENT OF CASE.
Error to the Circuit Court of Wayne County, upon
an appeal thereto from an order of the Probate Court,
awarding Jeane W. Pulling her distributive share of the per-
sonal estate of Dr. Henry P. Pulling, deceased. Ada
M. Lothrop, el. al., heirs at law, took this writ of error.
Affirmed.
Opinion by LONG, J.
DOWER, AND ANTE-NUPTIAL RuLnASE OF DOWER.
Dower, by the common law, is the
widow's life estate in a third part
of the lands and tenements whereof
her husband was seised of an estate
of inheritance at any time during
the coverture. Although the word
is derived from the Latin, the
Roman "marriage portion" (con-
sisting of' money, goods or lands),
denominated dos, was brought by
the wife to the husband. Provi-
sion out of the husband's estate
for the sustenance of the widow and
education and nurture of the chil-
dren, seems to have originated
among the ancient Germans, con-
cerning whose customs TAcITUS
wrote: Dolem non uxor marito, sed
uxori matilus offert. The same
custom prevailed among the Goths,
Visigoths and Burgundians, who
applied it at first to chattels. As
successive conquests insured the
permanency of their land acquisi-
tions, affection, with generosity of
principles, prompted the extension
of dower to land. Danish'historians
record the introduction of dower
into their country by Sweyn, the
father of Canute, in gratitude to
the ladies who ransomed him with
their jewels when a captive among
the Vandals. Among the Saxons
dower was limited to personalty.
There are no traces of dower in
English lands previous to the
Norman Conquest. Sir MARTIN
WRIGHT considered it a branch of
the Norman doctrine of fiefs or
tenures. If so, it was no more than
a local custom. It was no part of
the primitive Feudal System, and
had no feudal reasons for its inven-
tion; but was expressly introduced
therein by the Emperor Frederick
II, the contemporary of Henry III,
of England. Before this reign, how-
ever, dower in lands in England
was recognized. In course of time,
from a mere interest in personalty
dower was extended to a condi-
tional allowance in one-half of the
husband's lands. If the husband
left children, dower was forfeited
by incontinency or re-marriage of
the widow. In the Introduction to
the Great Charter of Henry I (A.D.
Inoi), it is provided: "If the wife
survive her husband, and there be
no children, she shall have her
dower; but if there be children,
she shall have her dower only so
long. as she lives chastely." Dur-
ing the reign of Henry II, the
usual species of dower was dower
ad ostium ecciesiae, which was
"where tenant in fee simple of full
age, openly at the church door,
where all marriages were formerly
celebrated, after affiance made and
troth plighted between them, doth
endow the wife with the whole, or
such quantity as he shall please, of
his lands; at the same time speci-
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fying and ascertaining the same;
on which the wife, after her hus-
band's death, may enter without
further ceremony:" Co. Litt., 39;
2 Blacks. Com., 133. But the
feudal restraints would not allow
an endowment of over one-third
part of the lands, and less than that
was encouraged in the interest of
the feudal lord. If no dower was
assigned at the church porch, then
the common law endowed the wife
with one-third part of the lands
and tenements of which the hus-
band was seised at the time of the
marriage. This was called dos ra-
tionabiiis. If the husband pos-
sessed only personalty, and no
agreement was made as to dower
in realty subsequently to be ac-
quired, the endowment in goods,
chattels or money at the marriage
was sufficient for all time. By
.agna Charla common law dower
was extended to the third part of
all lands which the husband had
held at any time during coverture,
in these words: "But the third
part of all the lands of which her
husband was possessed in his life-
time, shall be assigned to her for
her dower, except she has been en-
dowed with less at the church
door." Thereafter, if at any time
during the coverture the husband
became solely seised of any estate
of inheritance in lands to which
any issue, which the wife might
have had, might, by possibility,
have been heir, she from that time
became entitled, on his decease, to
have one equal third part of the
same lands allotted to her, to be
enjoyed (by her in severalty) dur-
ing the remainder of her life:
Williams on Real Property, 6 Am.
Ed., 232; 2 Blacks. Com., 131-134.
In England, since January 1, 1834,
a widow is not entitled to dower
out of any land which shall have
been absolutely disposed of by her
husband in his lifetime or by his
will; she is only entitled to dower
as against the heir-at-law, but not
as against the devisee or the pur-
chaser under any deed in which
she has not joined. If the hus-
band dies intestate, the wife has
her dower in lands of which he was
possessed, unless he had executed
a declaration to the contrary:
Statute 3 and 4 Williams IV, c.
io5; Williams on Real Property, 6
Am. Ed. 232, 236, 237; 4 Kent's
Com., 51.
Irrespective of statutory enact-
ments and the common law method
of barring dower by fine or com-
mon recovery, at common law, the
right of dower, having once at-
tached, adhered to the land not-
withstanding a sale or devise by
the husband, unless the wife's con-
currence were obtained by a release
of her dower, the familiar instance
of this being her joining in the
conveyance as a grantor or mort-
gagor. The common law of Penn-
sylvania permitted it to be barred
by deed with separate acknowledg-
ment, and this irrespective of the
Act of February 24, 177o; Lloyd v.
Taylor, i Dallas, 17. By legislative
enactments in New Hampshire,
Vermont, Connecticut, Delaware,
Tennessee, Florida and Georgia,
the widow has dower only in such
lands whereof her husband died
seised: Stimson's Am. Stat. Law,
3202; Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn.,
317; Combs v. Young, 4 Yerger
(Tenn.), 218; Reid v. Campbell,
Meigs (Tenn.), 388; Thayer v.
Thayer, 14 Vt., 107. This is also
the law in Scotland. In Maine,
New Hampshire and Massachusetts,
a widow has no dower in wild land,
since it would be useless unless she
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improved it: Stimson's Am. Stat.
Law, 3219; Conner v. Shepherd,
15 Mass. 164; White v. Willis, 7
Pick., 143; Johnson v. Perley, 2 N.
H., 56. If the husband's alienee
improve such land before his death,
the widow has no dower in it, since
her husband was seised of no estate
therein of which she was dowable:
Webb v. Townsend, I Pick., 21.
This, however, is not the law in
Pennsylvania: Thompson v. Mor-
row, 5 S. & R., 290.
By the common law of England
a widow's right to dower was inde-
pendent of the debts of her hus-
band; but the contrary rule gen-
erally prevailing in the United
States gives the rights of creditors
precedence over the widow's dower:
Gardiner v. Miles, 5 Gill, 94; London
v. London, I Humph., i. In Combs
v. Young, 4 Yerger (Tenn.) 218,
however, it was decided that the
right of the widow to dower in the
lands of which the husband died
seised and possessed, is preferred
to that of the husband's creditors.
Statutes in North Carolina and In-
diana have declared the widow's
dower to be paramount to creditor's
claims. In Pennsylvania the sale
of lands upon judicial process
against the husband, before or after
his death, defeats dower therein:
Graff v. Smith, i Dallas, 484; Scott
v. Crosdale, 2 Id., 127. But noth-
ing short of a judicial sale works
an extinguishment. Thus an as-
signment by the husband expressly
forthe payment of debts will notbar
his wife's dower: Keller v. Michael,
2 Yeates, 30o; Eberle v,. Fisher, 13
Pa., 526; Helfrich v. Obermyer, 15
Id., 113; Worcester v. Clark, 2
Grant, 87. A sale of the lands of a
bankrupt by the assignee does not
divest the dower of the bankrupt's
wife: Lazear v. Porter, 87 Pa., 513.
In the same State dower is barred
by a sale under a levari facias on
a mortgage in which the wife did
notjoin: Scott v. Crosdale, 2 Dallas,
127; Killinger v. Reidenhauer, 6 S.
& R., 534; Reed v. Morrison, 12
Id., 21; by a sale under testamen-
tary power for the payment of
debts: Hannum v. Spear, i Yeates,
553; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8 Pa.,
126; and by a sale under authority
of the Orphans' Court, though not
by a sale under voluntary assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors:
Helfrich v. Obermyer, 15 Pa., 113;
Lazear v. Porter, 87 Id., 513. The
reason for the extinguishment of
dower in these cases without judi-
cial process against the wife is, that
her right is subordinate to the
rights of creditors; she is only en-
titled to the surplus. after their
claims are satisfied: Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 8 Pa., 126, 127. The
right of dower is a mere incident
of the marital relation, and does not
attach to the husband's estate for
the purposes of enjoyment until
all his debts are paid. Lands are
assets for the payment of debts:
Directors of Poor v. Royer, 43 Pa.,
146, 153.
At the common law it was neces-
sary that the husband be seised of
a legal estate of inheritance, as dis-
tinguished from an equitable estate
under Chancery liberality. Though
the Court of Chancery allowed
curtesy in the equitable estates of
wives, it did not permit dower in
the equitable estates of husbands:
D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Schoales &
Lefroy, 388; Chaplin v. Chaplin, 3
P. Wins., 229, 234; Smith v. Adams,
5 De Gex, M. & G., 712; Ransom
v. Ransom, 17 Fed. Rep., 331, 333 ;
Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa., 149. The
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legal title not being in the husband,
a wife at common law had no dower
in an equity of redemption: 4
Kent's Com., 43, 44; Dixon v. Sa-
ville, Br. Ch. Cas., 328; Stelle V.
Carroll, 12 Peters, 201, 205; May-
bury z. Brien, i5 Id., 21, 38. In
the United States custom and leg-
islation have generally permitted
dower in the equitable estate of a
husband. A contrary rule never
existed in Pennsylvania: Shoe-
maker v. Walker, 2 S. & R., 534;
Reed v. Morrison, 12 Id., i8; Kelly
v. Mehan, 2 Yeates, 515; Jones v.
Patterson, 12 Pa., 149; Pritts V.
Richey, 29 Id., 71, 76; Dubs v.
Dubs, 31 Id., 149; Junk v. Canon,
34 Id., 286. The common law rule
was abolished by implication in
Arkansas: Blakeney v. Ferguson,
20 Ark., 547; Kirby v. Vantreece,
26 Id., 368, 37o, and expressly in
England: Statute of 3 and 4 Wil-
liam IV, c. 105. In Alabama, Har-
rison v. Boyd, 36 Ala., 50 3 ; Illinois,
Greenbaum v. Austrian, 70 Ill., 591;
Kentucky, Gully v. Ray, 18 B. Mon.,
107; Maryland, Gleen v. Clark, 53
Md., 580, 6o4; Missouri, Duke v.
Brandt, 51 Mo., 221, 225; New
Jersey, Boyd v. Thompson, 21 N.
J. L ., 58, 61; 22 Id., 543, 548; New
York, Hicks v. Stebbins, 3 Lans.,
39; Johnson v. Thomas, 2 Paige,
377; Hawley v. James, 5 Id., 318;
North Carolina, Klutts v. Klutts, 5
Jones Eq., 8o; Ohio, Abbott v. Bos-
worth, 36 Ohio St., 6o5; Virginia,
Blair v. Thompson, iI Gratt., 44i;
and in Rhode Island, Tennessee
and West Virginia: Stimson's Am.
Stat. Law, 3212-17. The common
law rule that dower attached only
to legal estates, still exists in Con-
necticut, Steadiman v. Fortune, 5
Conn., 462; Delaware, Conroy v.
Conroy, 3 Del. Ch., 407; Georgia,
Day v. Solomon, 4o Ga., 32; Maine,
Mann 'v. Edson, 39 Me., 25; Kidder
v. Blaisdell, 45 Id., 461; Massachu-
setts, Reed v. Whitney, 7 Gray,
533, 538; Michigan, May v. Sprecht,
I Mich., 187; New Hampshire,
Hobbinson v. Dumas, 42 N. H., 296;
Oregon, Farnum v. Loomis, 2 Ore.,
29; South Carolina, Secrest v. Mc-
Kenna, 6 Rich. Eq., 72; Vermont,
Jenry v. Jenry, 24 Vt., 324, and in
Florida and Wisconsin: Stimson's
Am. Stat. Law, 3213, 3214, 3215.
At common law a widow is entitled
to dower in the whole of land
mortgaged or incumbered by the
husband after marriage by a con-
veyance in which she had not
joined, if not otherwise barred, ex-
cept in those States where by
statute she is only endowed of land
whereof the husband died seised.
In some States there are special
statutory provisions to the effect
that if the husband purchase land
during coverture and give a pur-
chase-money mortgage, she only
has dower in the equity even though
she did not join in the mortgage.
In lands mortgaged before marriage
the wife has dower, if at all, only
in the equity of redemption, and
statutes in Massachusetts, Maine,
Vermont, New York, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska,
Virginia, West Virginia, Arkansas
and Oregon give her dower as
against all but the mortgagee. Un-
less a husband mortgagee acquires
an absolute estate in the mortgaged
lands during coverture, the widow
has no dower therein, notwith-
standing statutory provisions, since
a mortgage is considered as pass-
ing no title, or is deemed to be
personalty: Stimson's Am. Stat.
Law, su!ira. In the United States
generally a mortgage is considered
as a mere security for a debt, and
the mortgagor legally as well as
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equitably seised except as to the
mortgagee and his assigns: Barker
v. Parker, 17 Mass., 564; Simonton
v. Gray, 34 Maine, 5o; Runyan v.
Stewart, 12 Barbour, 537. There-
fore, should the husband release
the equity of redemption, the wife
is entitled at his death to her dower
in the lands subject to the mort-
gage; if they are sold under the
mortgage her claim is for dower in
the surplus proceeds, if any there be:
4 Kent's Com., 44, 45; Shoemaker
v. Walker, 2 S. & R., 554; Reed v.
Morrison, 12 Id., i8; Smiley v.
Wright, 2 Ohio, 507; Crabb v. Pratt,
15 Ala., 843; Robinson v. Miller, i
B. Monroe, 91; Barker v. Parker,
17 Mass., 564; Kortright V. Cady,
21 N. Y., 343; Slaughter v. Cul-
pepper, 44 Ga., 3i9; 5 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, 899, et seq. But
common law dower has never ex-
isted, or has been abolished (other
analogous estates existing in its
place) in Arizona, California, Col-
orado, Dakota, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana (where
the civil law obtains), Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
In the other States it exists in a
more or less modified form: thus
in Connecticut, possession is sub-
stituted for seisin; in Alabama, the
interest in one-half; in Arkansas,
dower is given in personalty; in
Missouri, in leaseholds; in Ohio, in
remainders; in other States, as we
have seen, it is allowable in equit-
able estates, and in some is confined
to property of which the husband is
seised at his death: Stimson's Am.
Stat. Law, 3202.
A widow could only have dower
in an estate held in severalty or in
common. She could not claim
dower in a joint tenancy, since upon
the decease of a joint tenant the
surviving tenants are entitled, un-
der the briginal gift, to the whole
estate, and its nature permits no
intrusion: the husband is never
solely seised: Co. Litt., 3i, b; Wil-
liams on Real Property, 6 Am. Ed.,
233; Maybury v. Brien, 15 Peters,
21, 37. When partition occurs be-
tween tenants in common dower
attaches to the ascertained purpart
of the husband: Potter v. Wheeler,
13 Mass., 5c4; Mosher'v. Mosher,
32 Maine, 412. The inchoate right
of dower of the wife of a tenant in
common is defeated by a sale in
partition of the common property,
although she is not a party to the
proceedings: Holley v. Glover (S.
C.), 16 L. R. A., 776.
While the estate must be one of
inheritance, issue need not actually
be born, though had the wife chil-
dren they must have inherited. The
husband must have seisin. There
can be no dower in an estate for
years: Spangler v. Stanler, i Md.
Ch., 36; Whitmire v. Wright, 22
So. Car., 446; or in estates at will:
4 Coke, 22 a, 22 b. A wife can have
no dower out of an estate in re-
mainder expectant on an estate of
freehold, since there is no seisin in
the husband; though she is dowable
of a reversion expectant on a term
for years, as in that instance the
husband is seised of th6 freehold:
Co. Litt., 32 a; Dunham v. Osborn,
i Paige, 634; Green v. Putnam, I
Barbour, 500; Otis v. Parshley, Io
N. H., 4o3; Eldredge v. Forestal, 7
Mass., 253; Blood v. Blood, 23 Pick.,
8o. But the intestate laws of var-
ious States have modified in many
instances the common law doc-
trines, and under their general lan-
guage a widow may have her life
estate in a vested remainder which
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her husband owned at his death:
Cote's Appeal, 79 Pa., 235, 237.
A noteworthy instance of equit-
able and statutory regulation of
dower is seen in the application of
the doctrine of election, which
arises where the husband by will
provides for his wife and devises to
others the estate of which she is
dowable. The widow is then to elect
whether to claim her dower in op.
position to the will, or renounce
dower in acceptance of the devise:
Streatfield v. Streatfield, i White &
Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, 3
Am. Ed., 48o, note. In some of the
United States, by statute, a widow
is entitled to dower in addition to
devises or pecuniary provisions in
the will of her husband, if such
plainly appears to have been his
intention. In other States statutes
provide that the acceptance of a de-
vise bars dower: Stimson's Am.
Stat. Law, 3244. In Pennsylvania
any devise or bequest is taken to be
in lieu of dower (unless the testator's
intention is otherwise), and the
widow is put to an election: Scott's
Intestate Law (Pa.), 2 Ed., p. 46,
et seq. In Leinaweaver v. Stoever,
i W. & S. (Pa.), x6o, it was held
that the acceptance by a widow of
her share under the interstate laws
did not bar her from recovering
dower out of land which her hus-
band aliened in his lifetime. Gen-
erally, upon the determination of
the estate, or avoidance of the hus-
band's title, or because of a defect
therein, or by the operation of col-
lateral limitations, dower will be
defeated: 4 Kent's CoM., 49. Thus,
where the grantor of an estate on
condition enters for condition bro-
ken, the dower of the grantee's
wife falls with his estate: Beardslee
v. Beardslee, 5 Barb., 324. The
wife's dower may be defeated by
every subsisting claim) or encum-
brance, legal or equitable, which
existed before the inception of title
and whose effect is to defeat the
husband seisin. An agreement to
convey before dower attaches is en-
forceable in equity to the extinc-
tion of dower; if there has been an
equitable conversion dower is regu-
lated according to equitable prin-
ciples: 4 Kent's Com., 5o; Greene
v. Greene, i Ohio, 535; Crabtree v.
Bramble, 3 Atk., 68o, 687.
Aside from the usual preventives
of dower at common law (notably
divorce a vinculo matrimonii-
since ubi nullum Matrimonium,
ibi nulla dos-adulterous elope-
ment, treason, alienage, levying a
fine, or sufferiig a common recov-
ery during overture), the Statute
of Uses, 27 Henry VIII, c. IO, was
potential in its influence. Previous
to the statute the bulk of English
landed interests were conveyed to
uses. Though the equitable estate of
the husband were a fee simple, the
wife had no dower in it-because the
seisin was not in the husband but in
thetrustee. The necessity, therefore,
arose to make some provision for
the wife; and this was done, upon
marriage, by settling a special es-
tate to the use of husband and wife,
for their lives, in joint tenancy, or
Jointure; the estate enuring to the
benefit of the wife upon the death
of the husband. When the Statute
of Uses transferred the seisin from
the trustee to the cestui que trust,
the dower of every wife, i fso facto,
attached to all the husband's lands
and tenements, in addition to thoge
settled in jointure. Accordingly
the statute provided that upon mak-
ing an estate in jointure dower
should be barred. The statute ex-
pressly provided for a legalJointure,
which Lord Co3KR defines as a corn-
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petent livelihood of freehold for
the wife of lands and tenements,
to take effect, in profit or posses-
sion, immediately upon the death
of her husband, for the wife of the
wife at least (and not purauter vie),
made, before marriage, to herself
(and not to another in trust for her),
and in express satisfaction of the
whole of her dower: Co. Litt., 36b;
Vernon's Case, 4 Coke, i. The
jointure had to be made before mar-
riage, as coverture prevented con-
sent; or if made during coverture,
the widow could ratify or reject it
and elect to take her common law
dower. The provisions of the Stat-
ute of Henry VIII. have been sub-
stantially reenacted or adopted in
the United States: Alex. Br. Stat.,
300, 301; Stimson's Am. Stat. Law,
H 3241-3244. In 1787, New York
adopted the statute verbatim,
though subsequent legislation has
imposed modifications: 4 Kent's
Com., 56; Kennedy v. Nedrow, i
Dallas, 4r5, 417; Hastings v. Dick-
inson, 7 Mass., 153; Ambler v. Nor-
ton, 4 Hen. & Munf. (Va.), 23.
By the common law, irrespective
of the Statute of Uses, no provision
br settlement made by a man before
his marriage in favor of his intended
wife could bar dower; nor could a
woman be bound by an ante-nuptial
release of her dower. It was a
maxim of the common law that no
right could be barred before it ac-
crued, and, also, that no right to an
estate of freehold could be barred
by any manner of collateral satis-
faction or recompense: Co. Litt.,
36 b.; Vernon's Case, 4 Coke, i.
Even to this day, except under the
provisions of the Statute of Uses
or other legislative enactment, no
settlement or agreement between
intended husband and wife is at law
abarto dower. In equity, however,
jointures and ante-nuptial releases
of dower are sustainable. Any
reasonable provision, whether se-
cured out of realty or personalty,
which an adult person, previous to
marriage and uninduced by fraud
or imposition, agrees to accept in
lieu of dower, will be a good joint-
ure in equity, although it be want-
ing in the requisites of a legal
jointure-and operate as a bar to
any subsequent claim to dower:
Dyke v. Rendall, 2 DeGex, M. &
G., 209; Wentworth v. Wentworth,
69 Maine, 247; Heald's Petition, 2
Foster (22 N. H.), 265; Cole v.
Amer. Bapt. Home Miss. Society
(N. H.), 14 Adt. Rep., 73; Hastings
v. Dickinson, 7 Mass., 153; Gibson
v. Gibson, 15 Id., io6; Vincent v.
Spooner, 2 Cushing, 467; Miller v.
Goodwin, 8 Gray, 542; Tarbell v.
Tarbell, IO Allen, 278; Jenkins v.
Holt, ro9 Mass., 261; Freeland v.
Freeland, 128 Id., 509; Deshon _v.
Wood, 148 Id., 132; Andrews v.
Andrews, 8 Conn., 79; Boardman's
Appeal, 4o Id., I69; M'Cartee v.
Teller, 2 Paige, 511; Johnston v.
Spicer, 107 N. Y., 185: Gorham v.
Fillmore, iii Id., 251; Ellmaker v.
Ellmaker, 4 Watts, 89; Wilson's
Estate, 2 Pa., 325; Withers v. Wea-
ver, 1O Id., 391; Schoch v. Schoch's
Exrs., 19 Id., 252; Talbot v. Calvert,
24 Id., 327; Withington's Appeal,
32 Id., 419; Renziehansen v. Keyser,
48 Id., 351; Russell's Appeal, 75
Id., 269; Phila. Trust Co.'s Appeal,
io8 Id., 311; Neely's Appeal, 124
Pa., 4o6, and cases'therein cited;
Kesler's Estate, 143 Id., 386; Naill
v. Maurer, 25 Md., 532; Busey v.
McCurley, 61 Id., 436; Faulkner v.
Faulkner's Exrs., 3 Leigh (Va.),
255; Charles v. Charles, 8 Grattan
(Va.), 486; Findley v. Findley, i1
Id., 434; Beard v. Beard, 22 W. Va.,
130; Cauley v. Lawson, 5 Jones' Eq.
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(No. Car.), 132; Brooks v. Austin,
95 No. Car., 474; Gelzer v. Gelzer,
I Bailey's Eq. (So. Car.), 387; Lipp-
man v. Boals, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 283;
Martin v. Martin, 22 Ala., 86; Cul-
berson v. Culberson, 37 Ga., 296;
Brown v. Ransey, 74 Id., 210;
Huguley v. Lanier, 12 Southeastern
Rep., 922; Williamson v. Yagdr, I5
Id., 66o; Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio,
6IO; Murphy v. Murphy, 12 Ohio
St., 407; Mintier v. Mintier, 28 Id.,
307; McNutt v. McNutt, 1i6 Ind.,
545; 2 L. R. A. (and note), 372;
Phelps v. Phelps, 72 Ill., 545; Jor-
dan v. Clark, 81 Id., 465; McGee v.
McGee, 91 Id., 548, 551; McMahill
v. McMahill, io5 Id., 596; Barth v.
Lines, 118 Id., 374; McAnnulty v.
McAnnulty, 12oId., 26; Aultman v.
Pettys, 59 Mich., 482; Logan v.
Phillips, iS Mo., 22; Gordon v.
Eans, 8 Western Rep., 6oo; lack
v. Heiss, Id., 203: Collins v. Collins,
72 Iowa, 1O4; Bottomly v. Spencer,
36 Fed. Rep., 732.
In Johnston v. Spicer, 1o7 N. Y.,
I85, 19I (r887), it was held that
arte-nuptial contracts intended to
regulate and control the interest
which each of the parties to the
marriage shall take in the property
of the other during coverture or
after death, are favored by the
"Courts and will be enforced in
equity according to the intention
of the parties. In Lant's Appeal,
95 Pa., 279 (I88o), a woman in con-
templation of marriage obtained
from her intended husband his
verbal consent to her disposal of
her property. The day before
her marriage she executed a will
whereby, after liberally providing
for him, she bequeathed the residue
of her estate to relatives, friends
and charities. And it was held that,
while according to the Pennsylvania
atute of April 8, 1833, marriage
revoked the will, it might, neverthe-
less, take effect in equity as an ante-
nuptial settlement, and that on
everyprincipleof equitable estoppel
the husband was prevented from
objecting to its complete enforce-
ment; SHARSWOOD, J., applying
the principle of equity that wheie
a person has a legal right to dispose
of property and intends to do so
and the instrument to carry out
this intention is at law ineffectual,
the Courts will regard it as re-
formed and decree it to be such as
it ought to have been effectually to
carry out the intention. Ante-
nuptial agreements between per-
sons contemplating marriage, con-
cerning their property, are favored:
Kesler's Estate, 143 Pa., 386, unless
advantage is taken of the confidence
induced by the relation of the par-
ties contracting: Kline v. Kline, 57
Pa., 12o; Shea's Appeal, 121 Id.,
302; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y.,
154; or the alienation is in fraud
of creditors' rights: Magniac v.
Thompson, 7 Peters, 348; Deshon
v. Wood, 148 Mass., 132; Russell's
Appeal, 75 Pa., 269. Marriage
alone is ample consideration: Mag-
niac v. Thompson, 7 Peters, .348;
Deshon v. Wood, 148 Mass., 132;
McNutt v. McNutt, i6 Ind., 545,
548 et seq.; 2 L. R. A. (and note),
272; Merritt v. Scott, 5o Am. Dec.,
373; Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan., 449,
46o; Gackenbach v. Brouse, 4 W.
& S. (Pa.), 546; Bannan's Appeal,
I Walker (Pa.), 1i; Wind v. Haas,
8 Pa. C. C. Rep., 645; 14 Am. and
Eng. Ency. of Law, 544. In Rahe
v. Real Estate Savings Bank, 96
Pa., 128 (i88o), it was decided that
an ante-nuptial release of dower
applies to realty subsequently ac-
quired unless it is expressly ex-
cepted from its operation. In
M'Cartee v. Teller, 2 Paige, 511; 8
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Wend., 267, it was held that a joint-
ure on an infant before coverture
bars dower, since it is a provisione
viri for the wife's support and does
not arise ex contractu; and, there-
fore, inability to consent is im-
material. But it has elsewhere
been held that a widow may elect
to ratify or reject an ante-nuptial
contract made when an infant: 4
Kent's Com., 55, 56; Grogan v.
Garrison, 27 Ohio St., 5o; Shaw v.
Boyd, 5 S. & R. (Pa.), 312; Wilson
v. McCullough, i Pa., 77, 86, 87;
Whichcote v. Lyle's Exrs., 28 Id.,
73; Scott's Intestate Law (Pa.), 2
Ed., 494. In Rhode Island, Vir-
ginia, Ohio, Kentucky and Mis-
souri a widow is privileged to claim
her dower and waive an estate con-
veyed to her in lieu of dower when
she was an infant or feme covert.
Indeed, it is believed to be the
general rule throughout the United
States that to bar dower the woman's
consent must be expressly given
before marriage when she is sui
juris and thoroughly acquainted
with the nature of her rights and
action: Williams on Real Property,
6 Am. Ed., 236, note i.
The relations of the parties to an
ante-nuptial release of rights which
marriage would give them in the
estates of each other, are those
of strictest confidence; and while
many courts have specially favored
such contracts, they watch with
careful eye lest the confidence be
abused, and will set aside the con-
tract, upon the ground of construc-
tive fraud, if unfairness is appar-
ent: Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa., i2o;
Pierce v. Peirce, 71 N. Y., 154;
Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa., 512,
518, et seq.; 31 V. N. C., i5; Shea's
Appeal, 121 Pa., 302; Russell's Ap-
peal, 75 Id., 268; Boyd v. De La
Montagnie, 73 N. Y., 498, 502-3;
Huguenin v. Baseley, T4Vesey, 273;
2 Tudor's L. C. Eq., 6 Eng. Ed.,
597, 619; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15
Beavan, 278.
In the leading case of Kline v.
Kline, 57 Pa., 120, 122 (1868), Mr.
Justice SHARSWOOD says: "There
is, perhaps, no relation of life in
which more unbounded confidence
is reposed than in that existing be-
tween parties who are betrothed to
each other. Especially does the
woman place the most implicit
trust in the truth and affection of
him in whose keeping she is about
to deposit the happiness of her
future life. From him she has no
secrets; she believes he has none
from her. To consider such per-
sons as in the same category with
buyers and sellers, and to say that
they are dealing at arm's length,
we think is a mistake. Surely,
when a man and woman are on the
eve of marriage, and it is proposed
between them . . . to enter
into an ante-nuptial contract upon
the subject of 'the enjoyment and
disposition of their respective
estates,' it is the duty of each to
be frank and unreserved in the dis-
closure of all circumstances materi-
ally bearing on the contemplated
agreement. It may, perhaps, be
presumed, in the first instance, that
such disclosure was made; but any
designed and material conceal-
ment ought to avoid the contract
at the will of the party who has
been injured." The confidential
relation requires uberrima fides-
the parties must deal upon the
basis of good faith, mutual confi-
dence and equality of condition.
This statement of a celebrated
jurist has received the endorsement
not only of subsequent decisions in
Pennsylvania, but those in other
States; the latest case being, ap-
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parently, Pulling's Estate, Loth-
rop's Appeal, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Michigan, on Oc-
tober 4, IS92, the facts of which ap-
.pear an e p. 831.
The facts in Kline v. Kline,
snpra, were these: A contract (re-
citing an intended marriage, which
occurred shortly afterward), was
made by which the woman was to
retain her estate, and if she became
a widow was to have thereafter, for
life, a certain portion of the dwell-
ing-house and $4o annually from
her husband's estate. Seventeen
years after the marriage the hus-
band died, possessed of an estate
worth $iS,ooo, beside the dwelling-
house; and his widow sought to
have the ante-nuptial contract de-
clared invalid, because of misrep-
resentations as to his estate, which
induced her to sign the contract for
an inadequate consideration. It
was contended that the woman
should have availed herself of op-
portunity for information, and if
she neglected it, she was in fault.
But it was held by SHARSWOOD, J.,
that this "would be revolting to
all the better feelings of woman's
nature. To have instituted in-
quiries into the property and for-
tune of her betrothed, would have
indicated that she was actuated by
selfish and interested motives. She
shrank back from the thought of
asking a single question. She exe-
cuted the paper without hesitation
andwithout inquiry. She believed
that he would propose nothing but
what was just, and she had a right
to exercise that confidence:" 57
Pa., 123. An auditor subsequently
found, as a fact, that upon the day
of the execution of the contract,
three-fourths of the man's property
was concealed from the woman.
He held that the facts presented a
54
strong case of constructive, if not
actual fraud, and upon failure of
affirmative proof that the man per-
formed his duty and acted in fair-
ness, allowed the widow her rights
in the estate, irrespective of the
ante-nuptial contract. In sustain-
ing the decision, SHAaswooD, J.,
said: "While it might not be neces-'
sary to show affirmatively that
there was a full disclosure of the
property and circumstances of
each, yet if the provision secured
for the wife was unreasonably dis-
proportionate to the means of the
intended husband, it raised the
presumption of designed conceal-
ment, and threw upon him the bur-
den of disproof:" Kline's Estate,
64 Pa., 122, 126; Tiernan v. Binns,,
92 Id., 248, 252; Bierer's Appeal,
Id., 265; Ludwig's Appeal, ioI Id.,
535; Smith's Appeal, II5 Id., 319;
Shea's Appeal, 121 Id., 302; Neely's
Appeal, 124 Pa., 4o6; Campbell's
Appeal (a case of post-nuptial .ettle-
ment), So Id., 298, 309.
In Bierer's Appeal, 92 Pa., 265
(iSSo), it appeared that in consider-
ation of five dollars to be paid thirty
days after the death of Everhart
Bierer, his betrothed, by ante-nup-
tial contract, agreed to release all
right and claim to all the real and
personal estate, including money,
of which he may die seised or pos-
sessed. At that time the man was
worth $6o,ooo, and the woman with-
out property or means of support.
It was held, per MERcUR, J., that
"this paltry sum of five dollars was
manifestly so unreasonable, and
disproportionate to the value of
his property, as to raise the pre-
sumption that he designedly con-
cealed from her the value thereof.
. . In the absence of any evi-
dence showing he made a statement
to her of any sum that he was worth,
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we cannot presume that she would
have accepted such a nominal sum
had she been fully and truthfully
informed :" 92 Pa., 266. In Lud-
wig's Appeal, ior Pa., 535 (1882),
a .wealthy widower of fifty-seven
years of age, who had eleven chil-
dren, and a destitute widow of sixty-
three years, being about to marry,
executed an antenuptial contract,
whereby the woman, in considera-
tion of "one dollar and a comfort-
able support during her life and at
her death a decent Christian bu-
rial," relinquished all her rights in
the man's estate. The agreement
recited that the man owned "cer-
tain lands and tenements, also per-
sonal property ;" the scrivener ex-
plained the effect of the instrument
to the woman before execution,
and stated that her intended hus-
band "had a large property," but
the extent or value of it was not
communicated to her. Its value
exceeded over $r4,ooo. Upon the
decease of her husband fourteen
years after-the marriage, it was held
that the circumstances indicated
the absence of fraudulent conceal-
ment on the man's part in procur-
ing the consent of the woman to
the ante-nuptial settlement, the con-
sideration was ample, and the
widow was not entitled to $3oo ex-
emption contrary to the terms of
the contract: following Tiernan v.
Binns, 92 Pa., 248. In Smith's Ap-
peal, 115 Pa., 319; 19 W. N. C.,
187 (1887), it appeared that by ante-
nuptial agreement a woman re-
leased her dower in her intended
husband's estate upon his setting
aside a certain property for her use,
assessed at $12,5oo. A month after-
ward the parties married. The hus-
band died seventeen years after-
ward, leaving an estate appraised at
$4oo,co3, and bequeathing his wife
the interest of $I5,OOO for life.
When married, he was worth $175,-
ooo and had six adult children, by
a former wife. It was held, per
PAXSON, J., that the provision in
the settlement was not so dispro-
portionate to the man's means as
to create a presumption of fraud
and concealment, i5 Pa., 324. In
Shea's Appeal, 121 Pa., 302; 22 W.
N. C., 328 (1888), the facts were
these: Thomas Shea, a widower
seventy years old, with several
adult children, staied to his affi-
anced, Susan Murphy, a widow of
mature years, that he was worth
from $75,000 to $8o,ooo, but he was
unwilling to allow his intended
wife to have more of his estate than
a good home and $3o a month if
she survived him. He suggested
that a lawyer draw an agreement
to that effect, which she indignantly
opposed. Two days afterward, and
about an hour before the parties
were married, an attorney em-
ployed by Shea appeared with a
contract which the couple signed
with their marks, by which the wo-
man relinquished her dower and
all interest il the estate of her in-
tended husband in consideration of
$3o to be paid her monthly after his
death, the sum to be a charge on
his realty. The woman was illiter-
ate, and there was no proof (before
the master in an equitable proceed-
ing after the husband's death by
the widow for the assignment of
her dower) that the contract was
explained to the woman or that
her previous determination not
to sign such an agreement was
changed; but there was proof that
sh regarded the paper as a
precaution against any advantage
which might be taken of her by her
stepchildren. The Supreme Court
held that the widow was entitled to
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dower, and 'the ante-nuptial settle-
ment was accordingly set aside,
GRE ZN, J., saying: "The proof
scarcely amounts to evidence of a
positive misrepresentation of the
contents of the paper, but it is per-
suasive of a mistaken conception
of it on her part:" 121 Pa., 32r. In
Neely's Appeal, 124 Pa., 4o6; 23 W.
N. C., 336 (1889), the appellant
sought to have invalidated an ante-
nuptial agreement executed by her
and Robert Neely a few days before
marriage, by which he relinquished
all claim upon her estate and cov-
enanted to allow her $6oo per an-
num after his death in full of all
claim upon his estate. The con-
tracting parties were cousins. He
was 6o years old, had previously
been married twice and had chil-
dren byeitherwife. The appellant
was 50 years of age and had never
been married. Her estate equaled
$ 2,oo, while that of Mr. Neely
was several times larger. The con-
tract was prepared by Mr. Neely's
lawyer; and a few days before the
marriage, when public announce-
ment of the wedding had been
made, Mr. Neely took it to his be-
trothed, who objected, amid tears,
to signing it; he then said: "If you
don't sign it there will be no wed-
ding." Several hours later she
signed the paper, after her nearest
relatives-an uncle and two brothers
(one of whom was named as trustee
in the settlement)-were called in
and after the paper was read and
explained; but no disclosure ap-
peared to have been made by either
as to the extent of their individual
estates, nor did the woman ask for
advice. Ten years after the mar-
riage the husband died, providing in
his will for the payment of the an-
nuity of $6oo, and leaving his wife,
in addition, the mansion house and
furniture so long as she cared to
use the same. The widow sought
to set aside the ante-nuptial con-
tract as being in fraud of her rights
as widow and having been extorted
unwillingly. The Common Pleas
found there was neither actual nor
constructive fraud in the execution
of the contract, and refused to set
it aside. In affirming this decision,
PAxsoN, C.J., said: " Was the pro-
vision which Mr. Neely made for
his intended wife so dispropor-
tioned to his means as to create a
presumption of fraud or intended
concealment? That the appellant
knew when she signed the paper
that he was a man of large means,
is clear from the fact that she ob-
jected to it on the ground of its
meanness. When we consider the
question of the adequacy of the
provision we must regard all the
circumstances surrounding the
case. This-was a marriage between
persons well advanced in years.
The appellant was not the mother
of his children, nor was she likely
ever to bear him any. She had not
in any way aided him to accumu-
late his fortune. She had $12,ooo
of her own, all of which he relin-
quished. In addition he gave her
$6oo per year during her life.
What claim had this old woman,
marrying this old man, to come in
and take one-third of his estate
away from his children and yet re-
tain the whole of her own? She
would, of course, have had a legal
claim had he married her without
an ante-nuptial contract; but she
had no claim which made it in-
equitable or unjust in him to insist
upon the execution of the contract
before the marriage. It would
have been a wrong to his own blood
if he had not made some such ar-
rangement. It was not a liberal
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provision, but it was adequate. She
retains all of her own estate, and
has now in addition $6oo per year,
besides a comfortably furnished
home. Surely her last condition
is better than her first. There is a
marked distinction between this
case and that of a young couple
just entering upon the voyage of
life. In the latter instance they
grow up together; the wife is the
mother of his children: she shares
his burdens in his early struggles,
arild often by her thrift and economy
aids him in the accumulation of his
fortune. To cut off such a wife
with a mere support during life
would be as unjust as it would be
ungenerous. But when a man in
the decline of life, who has been
twice a widower, and who has two
sets of children, for the third time
leads a woman to the altar, and an
elderly woman at that, it is very
different. In such case the wife
reaps where she has not sown, and
if she is provided with a comfort-
able support after her husband's
death she has no just cause of com-
plaint. In any event, if she is
dissatisfied she ought to refuse to
sign the contract, and not accept
its benefits during her husband's
life, and then seek to repudiate it
after his death:" 124 Pa., 426-7.
STERRETT, J., dissented. In Kes-
ler's Estate, 143 Pa., 386; 29 W. N.
r., 15 x891), it was held that where
.an intended wife, knowing her
:rights and informed of the situa-
.tion, deliberately releases all her
-interest in her husband's estate in
,consideration of an ante-nuptial
:settlement, there must be two wit-
nesses, or the equivalent, to show
that a fraud was practised upon
her in the execution of the con-
tract. Such an agreement can only
be revoked for a meritorious con-
sideration. The fact that the wife,
after having voluntarily estranged
herself from her husband's because
of her dissatisfaction with the ante-
nuptial agreement, came back to
him, is not sufficient consideration
for a revocation of the agreement;
neither is the abandonment of legal
proceedings for such revocation
sufficient consideration. (But see
Burkholder's Appeal, 1o5 Pa., 31.)
STERRETT, J., held there was no
apparent reason why the law should
regard with disfavor the ante-nup-
tial agreement. "Mr. Kesler was
advanced in years, had already ac-
cumulated a fortune, and had a
family bya former marriage; while
Mrs. Davison was lifted out of
poverty and comfortably provided
for by it. Persons situated as they
were do not usually act from mere
impulse, or contract without con-
sideration. . . . A full disclosure
was made to the intended wife, and
every opportunity afforded her
either to obtain information as to
the nature and character of the
instrument she came prepared to
execute, or object to its execution
if ignorant of its contents or de-
ceived as to its purpose and object.
She was not illiterate, but intelli-
gent and well educated. She was
not young, but of mature years and
acquainted with marital rights and
duties. "
In Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y., 154,
an ante-nuptial contract, whereby in
consideration of $5oo to be paid the
intended wife if she survived her
husband, she covenanted to release
her dower and interest in his per-
sonal estate, was set aside, it appear-
ing that at the time of executing
the contract the man was possessed
of realty, valued at $25,ooo, and the
bride assented to the contract under
the erroneous understanding that
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she was to receive $Soo in cash, a
a deed of a house and lot, in addi-
tion to the $5oo, to be paid if she
survived the husband; and the hus-
band intentionally permitted her
to remain in ignorance of the real
terms of the contract. MrU.LR,J.,
said: "Antenuptial contracts wheie-
by the future wife releases her claim
to her right of dower and all other
rights to the estate of her husband
upon his decease, are fully recog-
nized in law. When fairly made
and executed without fraud or im-
position, they will be enforced by
the courts. The surrender and re-
lease of rights to be acquired by
the intended wife by the marriage
relation must, however, be regarded
with the most rigid scrutiny; and
courts will not enforce contracts of
this nature against the wife where
the circumstances establish that she
has been overreached and deceived,
or been induced by false represen-
tations to enter into a contract
which does not express or carry out
the real intention of the parties.
The relationship of parties who are
about to enter into the married
state, is one of mutual confidence,
and far different from that of those
who are dealing with each other at
arm's length. This is especially the
case on the part of the woman; and
it is the duty of each to be frank
and unreserved when about to enter
into an ante-nuptial contract, by a
full disclosure of all facts and cir-
cumstances which may in any way
affect the agreement. . . . The
courts require strict proof of fair-
ness, when called upon to enforce
an ante-nuptial contract against the
wife, and especially when it is ap-
parent that the provision made for
the wife is inequitable, unjust, and
unreasonably disproportionate to
the means of the husband. The
rule undoubtedly is, that in such a
case every presumption is against
the validity of the contract, and
the burden of proof is cast upon
the husband, or those who repre-
sent him, in order to uphold and
enforce the same as a valid and sub-
sisting agreement. It is also a well
settled principle that a court of
equity will interpose its power to
set aside an instrument executed
between parties who stand in confi-
dential relations, when there is evi-
dence showing fraud, or even when
it appears that undue influence has
been exercised, when one party is
so situated as to exercise a control-
ling influence over the will, con-,
duct, and interests of the other:"
71 N. Y., 157-9.
In Andrews v,. Andrews, 8 Conn.,
79 (i83o), it appeared that in con-
sideration of contemplated marriage
between a man and woman aged 74
and 73 years respectively, and pos-
sessed of large estates, the parties
individually agreed to release all
interest which otherwise would ac-
crue in the estate of the other upon
marriage. It was held, that in the
absence of misrepresentation, or
abuse of confidence, the release of
the woman was valid; and the in-
adequacy of onsideration no
ground for contention, since mar-
riage itself was a valuable consider-
ation, and such agreements are emi-
nently to be favored by courts of
equity.
In Tarbell v. Tarbell, io Allen
(Mass.), 278 (1865), an ante-nuptial
contract, between a man of 84 years
and a woman of middle age, where-
by she released her dower in con-
sideration of marriage and $i,ooo
in stock, was sought to be set aside
by her upon her husband's death
two years after marriage, upon the
ground that she signed immediately
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before marriage, and under excite-
ment of mind, without time for ex-
amination, and understanding it to
be a mere receipt for the stock
which she had previously accepted
as a gift. But HOAR, J., said: "We
find no reason to doubt that she
entered into the agreement with a
full understanding of its force and
effect; that it was made without
fraud or misrepresentation on the
part of her husband; was a reason-
able one under all the circumstan-
ces, supported by an adequate con-
sideration, and that it has been
fully performed on his side:" io
Allen, 280. See, also, Sullings v.
Richmond, 5 Id., 187. In the recent
Massachusetts case of Peaslee v.
Peaslee, I7 N. E. Rep., 5o6 (1888),
upon a writ of dower, it was held,
that demandant's testimony, that
being about to execute an ante-nup-
tial contract before she read it
through she said to her promised
husband, "I suppose it is just as
you talked," and he said, "Yes;"
that she believed him, and signed
without other knowledge of the
contents; while in fact the provision
made for her was not what he had
promised in the talk referred to,
was sufficient to warrant a finding
that she signed by fraudulent rep-
resentation. Such being the case
it was invalid, and her coverture
prevented a ratification.
In Peck v. Peck, 12 R. I., 485
(1880), an ante-nuptial contract was
made shortly before the marriage
of persons who had previously co-
habited, and as a prerequisite to the
ceremony, by which the parties
mutually released all claim arising
from the marriage to the property
of either. The intended husband
had considerable personalty, but
little realty; the intended wife had
little personalty, but expected to in-
herit some realty. In sustaining
the agreement, after the death of
the husband, DURvEz, C. J., said:
"When we consider that the mar-
riage would give her no right in her
husband's personalty of which he
could not deprive her, and that he
might possibly become entitled to
curtesy in the estate that she was
expecting to inherit, we think it
cannot be said that the contract was
without any adequate consideration
or that it was grossly inequitable or
unjust:" 12 R. I., 487-8.
In Busey v. McCurley, 61 Md.,
436 (1883), the facts were these: By
an ante-nuptial settlement between
a widower with several children and
a widow with one child, it was cov-
enanted that the intended wife, if
she survived the husband, should
receive at his death one dwelling
house,tobe vested in herabsolutely,
in lieu of dower or distributive
share of his estate. The marriage
proved unhappy and by will the
husband disposed of his entire es-
tate, consisting principally of $[oo-
ooo worth of realty, undertaking
therein to discharge the obligation
in the marriage contract by devis-
ing her an insignificant dwelling
house, subject to an annual ground
rent of $64, which she renounced.
Upon a bill filed after the husband's
death it was held that the complain-
ant could renounce the devise, and
was entitled, under the covenant, to
receive from the husband's estate a
dwelling house suitable to his pecu-
niary circumstances and position in
society, or could receive a money
equivalent, since the specific exe-
cution of the covenant would be
attended with difficulty.
In Barth v. Lines, 118 Ill-, 374
(1886), a widower of forty-seven
years, who had nine children, the
owner of iooo acres of land worth
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over $8o,ooo, and possessed of per-
sonalty valued at over $1,5oo, a few
days before his marriage with a
widow, entered into an agreement
with her, in contemplation thereof,
marriage being the consideration,
whereby they mutually released in-
dividual claims arising by marriage
in the estate of either. Nine years
after marriage the husband died,
and the widow claimed dower; but
as it was shown the woman had
conducted a store in her own right,
and the marriage was a business
arrangement; and it was proved
that the woman fully understood
the meaning and effect of the ante-
nuptial contracts, he was debarred
of dower. In a very recent case in
Illinois, Achilles v. Achilles, 28
Northwestern Rep., 45 (1891), the
facts were that three days before
the marriage of a widower of 77
years and a widow 64 years, an
agreement was executed whereby
they mutually released claims to
each other's estate, and the widow,
should she survive him, was to re-
ceive during widowhood the use of
a portion of a house and $2oo per
annum payable from his estate.
Four years later the husband died,
and the widow claimed her dower,
alleging the invalidity of the ante-
nuptial contract because of misrep-
resentations inducing its execution,
and unreasonableness of its provis-
ions. When the parties were mar-
ried he was worth $20,ooo and she
had a dower income of over $5oo per
annum, and lived on $3 a week. The
Court held that misrepresentations
were not proved, and that the pro-
vision for the widow, in view of the
circumstances, was not unreason-
able. MAGRUDER, J., said: "The
parties to an ante-nuptial coutract
stand in a confidential relation to
each other, which requires good
faith and full disclosure, and the
absence of unreasonable and harsh
provisions. But in this case the
whole arrangement seems to hae
been of a purely business charac-
ter. . . . The ante-nuptial con-
tract and the proposition to marrj
were presented simultaneously, and.
the latter was not accepted until
the former was agreed upon.. . .
It cannot be said that she was pre-
vailed upon by the love and confi-
dence growing out of a marriage
engagement to sign the contract
when she positively refused to sign
it until her son had examined it
and had advised her in regard
to it."
In McNutt v. McNutt, 16- Ind.,
545 ; 2 L. R. A., 372 (1888), it was
held that where, in consideration of
marriage, persons of mature years,
after consideration and delibera-
tion, without fraudulent induce-
ment, sign an ante-nuptial release
of the interests marriage would
give them in the estates of each
other, it is valid if not unreasonable
in its terms. ELLIOTT, J., said:
"It was no more than equitable that
the prospective husband should, at
the time he made the contract, pro-
vide that his estate should go to his
children by a former wife. It is,
indeed, difficult to find any princi-
ple upon which courts can set aside
contracts made in good faith, with
due deliberation, and by persons of
mature age, even though that con-
tract be one between a man and
woman contemplating marriage.
It is stretching. . . . the power
of the courts a great way to de-
clare that a man and woman may
not, even though the latter has no
estate of her own, make their own
contracts:" 116 Ind., 549.
In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 42 Iowa, 6oo
(1876), a crippled widower, 62 years
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old, who had i i children and realty
worth $12,ooo, and a widow with 3
children, 4o acres of land and $7o0
or $8oo in money, entered into an
agreement precedingtheir marriage
stipulating that "each is to have
the untrammelled and sole control
of his or her property, real and
personal, as though no such mar-
riage had taken place. The couple
afterward, had two children and
lived together eight years, unhap-
pily because of the children by
their former marriages. Upon the
husband's death the widow claimed
her dower, but DAY, J., held the
contract was fair and, reasonable,
the advantages obtained by the
parties equal, and it was enforceable
in the absence of fraud and imposi-
tion: 42 Ia., 607. In Peet v. Peet,
46 Northwestern Rep., 1o51; 81
Iowa, 172 (see Peet's Estate, 79 Id.,
185), an ante-nuptial agreement
provided that the parties thereto
should not in any manner be re-
stricted in the control or disposition
of their respective properties; that
the woman thereby released all
right of dower and in lieu thereof
should receive, in case she survived
her husband, the interest of $3,ooo
per annum during widowhood. The
parties were over 50 years of age,
the man a widower with 3 children
and worth about $5o,ooo; the woman
without property and dependent
upon her brother and her personal
earnings for support. The parties
had previously been neighbors for
25 years. Upon the husband's
death the widow claimed dower,
alleging that the husband took ad-
vantage of the confidential relation
existing between them, by undue
influence she signed the contract,
and that it is unfair, unconscionable
and void. After finding that there
was no influence exerted, GIviN,
J., said: "In view of all the cir-
cumstances, we do not think the
agreement is so unreasonable as to
show undue influence. Mrs. Peet
had not contribluted to the accumu-
lation of the estate and was not'
likely to aid in its enhancement.
She was without a home or means
of support of her own, except her
earnings. Her ability to earn a.
living would decrease with increas-
ing years. By this agreement and
marriage she was assured of a home,
support and companionship with
the man of her choice, and the in-
terest on $3,ooo after his death, so
long as she remained his widow.
Meager as this provision is, yet it
was reasonable that in her circum-
stances she should be willing to
accept it. The circumstances did
not call for special liberality on the.
part of Mr. Peet. It was reasonable
that he should desire that no part
of his estate should pass to strangers,
through his wife, to the prejudice
of his children:" 81 Ia., 177-8.
In Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan., 449
(1885), it appeared that a widower,
who had seven adult children and
one minor, and possessed of prop-
erty worth $14,000, on the day of
his marriage and preceding it, en-
tered into a contract with his affi-
anced, who was 26 years of age,
and possessed two cows and $4o,
whereby they mutually agreed to
enjoy and control their individual
property, and upon the husband's
death the wife should receive a
share of his estate equal to that of
any of his children. Three years
afterward the husband died, worth
$i9,0oo, and the widow sought to
have the ante-nuptial contract held
invalid as unjust, unreasonable and
uncertain in its provisions. The
Court, however, ,held that agree-
ments of this kind were favored,
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and should be liberally interpreted
in effectuating the intentions of the
parties, if entered into in good
faith, by persons competent to con-
tract, and the terms were not un-
reasonable, considering the cir-
cumstances of the parties at the
time of contracting. In this in-
stance the husband properly made
provision for the children of his
first wife; the provision for the wife
was fair and highly equitable, and
no evidence appeared that the con-
versation and conduct preceding
the transaction were other than
open, honest and fair, and no ob-
jections were raised then or after-
wards. "The mere fact that he
may not have disclosed his assets
and liabilities in detail to her, will
not, in the absence of anything
showing fraud or deceit, invalidate
the contract, nor will it raise a
presumption of fraudulent conceal-
ment; and especially is this so
where the terms and provisions of
the contract are so manifestly fair
and reasonable as in this case: "
/ier JOHNSTON, J., 33 Kan., 459-462.
In Woodward v. Woodward, 5
Sneed, (Tenn.), 49 (1857), imme-
diately preceding the marriage of a
widower, aged 73 years, and an
illiterate widow of 45 years, an
agreement was executed, reciting
the contemplated marriage, and
allowing the widow, should she be
the survivor, the loan of two negro
men for life in satisfaction of all
claim to his estate. There being
circumstances tending to show im-
position by the husband, the widow,
upon the husband's death, was per-
mitted to disregard the settlement
and accept her dower and dis-
tributive portion of his estate.
In West v. Walker, 77 Wisc., 557
(i89o), it appeared that two months
preceding the marriage of a wid-
ower of 85 years, the father of sev-
eral children, with a widow of 6i
years, who had previously been
twice married, the woman released
her dower, in consideration of mar-
riage and $i,ooo upon the hus-
band's death, if she survived. The
woman had known the man for
twenty years, and was destitute of
property and means of support, ex-
cept the use of a house and lot.
When the man died he was worth
$25,ooo, and the widow sought to
set aside the agreement; but it was
held that the facts, together with
her omission to make inquiries
when signing the agreement, re-
pelled any claim that she was ig-
norant of its effect. In this case
the contract had been lost and
destroyed, but it was satisfactorily
proved by oral evidence, and effec-
tually barred her dower. (See, also,
Wilson v. Holt (1887), 83 Ala. 528).
In Spencer v. Boardman, 6 W. Rep.,
700 (ILL., 1886), dower was denied a
widow upon the protest of heirs
who alleged she had waived it by
ante-nuptial agreement whose con-
tents were proved by oral evidence
after it appeared the widow refused
to produce it upon notice, though
she claimed it was signed as she
was going on the floor to be mar-
ried, did not read the paper or
know what it was, and that it
was subsequently destroyed by
mutual consent. (See Smith v.
Linn, 4 Pennypacker, Pa., .479;
Gangwere's Estate, 14 Pa., 417.
In'Hunt's Appeal, xoo Pa., 59,
597 (1882), it was held that the ex-
istence of an oral ante-nuptial
agreement should not be found
save upon clear and convincing
proof. The burden of proof is on
those who aver its existence, and
they must do more than show a
slight preponderance of testimony;
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they must adduce that which will
be satisfactory when considered
with the counter-testimony. A
parol ante-nuptial settlement con-
cerning chattels is valid : Gacken-
bach v. Brouse, 4 W. and S. (Pa.),
546. An ante-nuptial release of
dower must be in writing: McAn-
nulty v. McAnnulty, 120 Ill., 26.
This lengthy consideration of the
subject of DowER has, doubtless,
shown the gradual yet determined
methods adopted to modify consid-
erably (and, at times, defeating) a
right which by the common law
partook of the nature of an inde-
feasible estate in a woman upon her
marriage. Ante-nuptial releases of
dower-so inconsistent with com-
mon law principles - are now
greatly favored, especially if the
contract be executed by old persons
who have passed the fruitful days
of connubial association. If the un-
derstanding were not induced by
misrepresentations or advantage
taken of the confidential relation of
the persons contracting in view o f
their impending marriage, the re-
lease is effectual to bar dower, unless
the provision for the widow is un-
reasonable. This unreasonableness
depends not so much on the value
of the husband's estate as upon the
circumstances surrounding the wo-
man previous to her marriage. If
the provision for a widow is not in-
compatible with her ante-nuptial
surroundings and she agrees to ac-
cept it understanding the advanta-
ges the impending marriage allows
her, she shall not claim her dower
upon the decease of her husband.
Though she in terms absolutely,
knowingly and unconstrainedly re-
lease her dower before marriage, as
in Pulling's Estate, Lothrop's Ap-
peal, ante p. 831, yet the Courts are
disposed to permit inconsistent
declarations of the husband to be
effectual in enlarging the widow's
portion to harmonize with the real
intentions of the parties.
ALFRED ROLAND HAIG.
